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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jose Juan Chavez-Alvarez appeals the District Court’s 
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  He contends 
that the Government is violating his right to due process by 
detaining him, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(c),1 without a bond 
                                              
1 “The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who 
. . . (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any 
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hearing since June 5, 2012.  We will reverse the District 
Court’s order and remand with instruction to grant the writ of 
habeas corpus and ensure that Chavez-Alvarez is promptly 
afforded a bond hearing. 
 
I. 
 Chavez-Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the 
United States at a young age without inspection and later 
adjusted to lawful permanent resident status.  He married a 
United States citizen, but is now divorced.  He has two sons 
who are United States citizens.  In 2000, while serving in the 
United States Army in South Korea, a General Court-Martial 
convicted him of giving false official statements (10 U.S.C. § 
907), sodomy (10 U.S.C. § 925), and violating the general 
article (10 U.S.C. § 934).2  It sentenced him to eighteen 
months of imprisonment.  He served thirteen months in prison 
and was released on February 4, 2002.   
 
                                                                                                     
offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), 
or (D) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B); See also 8 
C.F.R. § 241.3. 
 
2 “Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring 
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not 
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be 
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or 
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of 
the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that 
court.”  10 U.S.C. § 934. 
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 Immigration Customs and Enforcement agents arrested 
Chavez-Alvarez on June 5, 2012, and served him with a 
Notice to Appear, charging him with being removable under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his conviction on an 
aggravated felony.  He was ordered detained without bond 
under 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) and sent to York County Prison.  
  
 The total number of days that Chavez-Alvarez has 
been held in civil detention since his arrest, of itself, gives us 
reason for pause.  However, we judge the reasonableness of a 
detention during the removal process by “tak[ing] into 
account a given individual detainee’s need for more or less 
time, as well as the exigencies of a particular case.”  Diop v. 
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011).  Our 
close review of this record has been significant to our 
deliberation about the constitutionality of Chavez-Alvarez’s 
detention.  And so, we begin by summarizing what happened 
in the Immigration Court. 
 
II. 
 Shortly after his arrest, Chavez-Alvarez obtained 
counsel and challenged the Government’s case for removal.  
The Immigration Judge accepted pleadings on June 19, 2012; 
Chavez-Alvarez argued against removability.  Ten days later, 
the Government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), 
added a charge that Chavez-Alvarez was removable on the 
ground of being convicted for two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude.  Roughly five weeks after he was arrested, 
on July 11, 2012, the Immigration Judge denied Chavez-
Alvarez’s request for a bail hearing—filed two days after his 
arrest on June 7, 2012—ruling that he was subject to 
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mandatory detention under section 1226(c) in compliance 
with Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).   
 
 Between August and October of 2012, the Immigration 
Judge held two hearings.  During this time, Chavez-Alvarez 
denied that he was removable on the new charge, and 
challenged the Government’s claim that his earlier conviction 
made him removable.  Two issues emerged during these 
hearings:  whether the Manual for Courts Marshal—which 
the Government used to categorize his crime—has the effect 
of law; and, whether Chavez-Alvarez’s eighteen month 
sentence arose from all of his crimes, or just the sodomy 
conviction.  Chavez-Alvarez said at the October hearing that, 
if necessary, he would request a 212(h) waiver of 
inadmissibility, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).   
 
 The fifth hearing was held on November 1, 2012, 
almost five months into Chavez-Alvarez’s detention.  The 
Immigration Judge ruled that Chavez-Alvarez was removable.  
Specifically, he concluded that sodomy by force is a crime of 
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and (b), qualifying as an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  But, the 
Immigration Judge also told Chavez-Alvarez that he would 
consider a 212(h) waiver, and encouraged him to have a 
petition for an alien relative (Form I-130) filed on his behalf 
to accompany the waiver.  
  
 Over the next four months, the Immigration Judge held 
four more hearings.  During this time, it became clear that 
Chavez-Alvarez was seeking only a standalone waiver.3  This 
                                              
3 The Immigration Judge acted on an apparent credible 
possibility that Chavez-Alvarez would marry.  Later, Chavez-
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brought up a question of whether and when Chavez-Alvarez 
had been admitted to the country.  The Immigration Judge 
then requested briefing on the implications of the ruling in 
Matter of Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 218 (BIA 1980), to 
Chavez-Alvarez’s eligibility for the waiver.   
 
 On March 5, 2013, at the final hearing, nine months 
after he was arrested and detained, the Immigration Judge 
issued an oral decision denying Chavez-Alvarez’s application 
for a 212(h) waiver.  This was the sole remaining issue.  
Chavez-Alvarez stated that he was reserving his right to 
appeal. 
 
 On April 3, 2013, approximately 10 months after his 
arrest and detention, Chavez-Alvarez appealed to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The Government filed a 
motion with the BIA for a summary affirmance, but the BIA 
affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision in a precedential 
decision on March 14, 2014, over twenty-one months after 
Chavez-Alvarez’s arrest and detention.  Chavez-Alvarez then 
petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s decision.4  
                                                                                                     
Alvarez told the Immigration Judge that he was no longer 
considering marriage.   
 
4 On October 25, 2012, Chavez-Alvarez filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  The District Court granted Chavez-
Alvarez’s order to show cause on October 31, 2012.  It 
referred the petition to the Magistrate Judge on December 7, 
2012.  The Magistrate Judge held oral argument on May 29, 
2013 and issued a report and recommendation on December 
18, 2013, recommending the District Court deny the writ.  




 Chavez-Alvarez says that the Government is violating 
his due process rights by detaining him for an unreasonable 
amount of time without conducting a hearing at which he 
would have the opportunity to be released on bond.5  The law 
applying to Chavez-Alvarez’s issue is well established.  It 
was long ago decided that the Government has authority to 
detain any alien during removal proceedings.  Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).  Before 1996, 
significant numbers of aliens convicted of serious crimes 
were taking advantage of their release on bond as an 
opportunity to flee, avoid removal, and commit more crimes.  
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2003).  Congress fixed 
this problem by enacting section 1226(c), expanding the 
range of serious crimes for which the Government was 
required to detain convicted aliens.  Notably, section 1226(c) 
does not give the Attorney General any authority to release 
these aliens on bond.  Id. at 521.   
 
 The Supreme Court left no doubt that the 
Government’s authority under section 1226(c) to detain aliens 
without an opportunity for bond complies with the 
                                                                                                     
on January 2, 2014.  The District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on January 22, 2014, 
almost twenty months after Chavez-Alvarez was arrested and 
detained.  Chavez-Alvarez appealed to this court.  His case 
was docketed on February 21, 2014.   
 
5 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 




Constitution.  Id. at 531.  However, as we discuss below, we 
read Demore as also recognizing that there are limits to this 
power.  Diop, 656 F.3d 221; Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of the 
United States, 678 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 
 When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the law in Demore, it also gave us insight into how, from a 
due process perspective, section 1226(c)’s allowance of 
detention without bail worked.  The Court reiterated the 
fundamental idea that aliens are protected by constitutional 
due process.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 523 (citing Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).  But, it put the alien’s issue in 
perspective, saying ‘“[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes 
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”’  Id. 
at 521 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 
(1976)).  The Court went on to say that applying ‘“reasonable 
presumptions and generic rules”’ to groups of aliens—for 
purposes of due process—can be consistent with the idea that 
aliens can be treated differently.  Id. at 526 (quoting Flores, 
507 at 313); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 
(1952).   
 
 The Court, in essence, concluded that Congress 
lawfully required the Attorney General to make presumptions 
of flight and dangerousness about the alien solely because he 
belonged to the group of aliens convicted of the types of 
crimes defined in section 1226(c).6  These presumptions, 
                                              
6 Demore expresses the goal of the statute in terms of 
preventing flight (ensuring that aliens who are subject to a 
removal order will actually be removed (538 U.S. at 528.)).  
However, the Supreme Court also considered data that was 
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Demore says, justified the alien’s detention and eliminated 
the need for an individualized bond hearing:  they were the 
reason the alien’s six-month detention without a bond hearing 
was not an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.  Id. at 528 (“Such 
detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing 
deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their 
removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if 
ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.”). 
     
 Eight years after Demore, we addressed the question of 
whether the Government’s use of section 1226(c) to detain an 
alien for almost three years without a bond hearing complied 
with due process.  Diop, 656 F.3d 221.  Citing earlier 
decisions by the Supreme Court, we recognized the 
importance of judicial deference to the Executive Branch in 
immigration matters, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009), 
but also noted that a court must use its independent judgment 
to decide whether a detention is ‘“reasonably necessary to 
secure removal.”’  Diop, 656 F.3d at 234 (quoting Zadvydas, 
533 U.S. at 699).  Although the Government cited to Demore 
and argued it had authority to detain Diop for as long as the 
removal process takes, we highlighted Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Demore, which made it clear that 
balancing competing interests was implicit in the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that section 1226(c) was constitutional.  He 
said:   
                                                                                                     
examined by Congress on crime rates of aliens who had 
skipped bail.  Id. at 518-19. Therefore, in Diop, we said that 
the purpose of the statute is to “ensur[e] that an alien attends 
removal proceedings and that his release will not pose a 





[S]ince the Due Process Clause 
prohibits arbitrary deprivations of 
liberty, a lawful permanent 
resident alien such as respondent 
could be entitled to an 
individualized determination as to 
his risk of flight and 
dangerousness if the continued 
detention became unreasonable or 
unjustified. 
 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 684-86 (2001)).  Importantly, he added: 
 
Were there to be an unreasonable 
delay by the INS in pursuing and 
completing deportation 
proceedings, it could become 
necessary to inquire whether the 
detention is not to facilitate 
deportation, or to protect against 
risk of flight or dangerousness, 
but to incarcerate for other 
reasons. 
 
Id. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Considering this, 
along with the attention the Court gave to the average length 
of removal cases, we concluded that the Court in Demore 
expected the detentions under section 1226(c) to be brief, and 
that this expectation was key to their conclusion that the law 
complied with due process.  Diop, 656 F.3d at 233-34 (citing 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 529).  For all of these reasons, we said:  
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“[T]he constitutionality of this practice is a function of the 
length of the detention. . . . [T]he constitutional case for 
continued detention without inquiry into its necessity 
becomes more and more suspect as detention continues past 
[certain] thresholds.”  Diop, 656 F.3d at 232, 234.   
 
 By its very nature, the use of a balancing framework 
makes any determination on reasonableness highly fact-
specific.7  In circumstances like those in Demore, it is not 
                                              
7 Chavez-Alvarez and the American Civil Liberties Union as 
amicus urge us to adopt a rebuttable presumption that all pre-
removal detentions exceeding six months must be justified by 
the government at a bond hearing.  See Appellant's Br. at 24 
("[T]his Court has thus far declined to declare that all pre-
removal detentions exceeding six months must be justified by 
the Government at a bond hearing . . . . Such a rule would 
provide much-needed guidance to the district courts and ease 
the burden on detained noncitizens - most of whom cannot 
afford to retain counsel to pursue a habeas petition." (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)); ACLU Br. at 14 
("[T]he surest and simplest way to clarify the reasonableness 
standard is for the Court to establish a presumptively 
reasonable period, preferably six months, for which 
mandatory detention is authorized under § 1226(c), and after 
which a bond hearing before the [Immigration Judge] would 
usually be required.").  We declined to adopt presumptive 
thresholds in both Diop and Leslie, and we decline to do so 
now.  While we appreciate the merits of the presumption 
urged by Chavez-Alvarez and the ACLU, the highly fact-
specific nature of our balancing framework does not comport 




arbitrary or capricious to use a presumption that the alien will 
flee or be dangerous in the case of every detainee for the 
purpose of eliminating the need for bond hearings, because 
the cost of their short-term deprivation of liberty is 
outweighed by the need or benefit of detaining this whole 
group to achieve the goals of the statute.  The relative weight 
of the competing interests in cases like these favor the 
Government’s position.  Yet, due process requires us to 
recognize that, at a certain point—which may differ case by 
case8—the burden to an alien’s liberty outweighs a mere 
presumption that the alien will flee and/or is dangerous.  At 
this tipping point, the Government can no longer defend the 
detention against claims that it is arbitrary or capricious by 
presuming flight and dangerousness:  more is needed to 
justify the detention as necessary to achieve the goals of the 
statute.  As we said in Diop, section 1226(c) “implicitly 
authorizes detention for a reasonable amount of time, after 
which the authorities must make an individualized inquiry 
into whether detention is still necessary to fulfill the statute’s 
purposes of ensuring that an alien attends removal 
proceedings and that his release will not pose a danger to the 
community.”  Id. at 231.  In Diop’s case, we weighed the 
goals of the statute against the personal costs to his liberty 
resulting from his detention of roughly two years, eleven 
months, and concluded that Diop’s detention was 
unconstitutional.  Id. 
 In Diop, however, our balancing also took into account 
our finding that the Government was responsible for creating 
unreasonable delays.  Id. at 234.  In contrast, Chavez-Alvarez 
does not accuse the Government of creating unreasonable 
delays.  He attributes the length of his case to complex issues.  
                                              
8Diop, 656 F.3d at 234. 
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The Government uses Chavez-Alvarez’s position to defend 
the reasonableness of the detention here, pointing to our 
statement in Diop that every case is unique and requires 
different amounts of time.  See id.  Building on this idea, the 
Government says where its handling of the case is reasonable, 
and the length of the case is due mostly to issues raised by the 
alien, we have no authority to rule that the length of the 
detention is unreasonable.   
 
 The flaw in the Government’s argument is that it too 
closely ties the reasonableness of the detention to the way it 
acted during the removal process.  The primary point of 
reference for justifying the alien’s confinement must be 
whether the civil detention is necessary to achieve the 
statute’s goals:  ensuring participation in the removal process, 
and protecting the community from the danger that he or she 
poses.  See Demore, 538 U.S. at 528.  Therefore, it is possible 
that a detention may be unreasonable even though the 
Government has handled the removal case in a reasonable 
way.  Diop, 656 F.3d at 223  (“[I]ndividual actions by various 
actors in the immigration system, each of which takes only a 
reasonable amount of time to accomplish, can nevertheless 
result in the detention of a removable alien for an 
unreasonable, and ultimately unconstitutional, period of 
time.”). 
 
 The Government next wants us to judge the 
reasonableness of the detention based upon Chavez-Alvarez’s 
handling of the case.  It argues that Chavez-Alvarez created 
the circumstances that resulted in his long detention and he is 
not, therefore, deserving of any relief.  It takes care, however, 
to alter its position from the one it took in a case we decided 
in 2012.  Leslie, 678 F.3d 265.  There, it asserted—
15 
 
unsuccessfully—that the petitioner’s decision to appeal his 
removal order was the reason for a lengthy detention, 
undermining his claim that the detention was 
unconstitutional.  We granted Leslie’s petition, ruling that the 
Government’s position would ‘“effectively punish [Leslie] 
for pursuing applicable legal remedies.’”  Id. at 271 
(alteration in original) (quoting Oyedeji v. Ashcroft, 332 F. 
Supp.2d 747, 753 (M.D. Pa.2004)).  In this case, the 
Government acknowledges that Chavez-Alvarez raised 
complicated issues that required time to argue and decide, but 
it wants us to focus on the fact that, thus far, his challenge has 
been unsuccessful.  It argues that Chavez-Alvarez has been 
merely delaying his inevitable removal.    
 
 Although, as we will explain, we are not persuaded 
that Chavez-Alvarez’s case is little more than a delay tactic, 
we get the point that the Government is trying to make:  
certain cases might be distinguishable from our holding in 
Leslie.  An argument could be made that aliens who are 
merely gaming the system to delay their removal should not 
be rewarded with a bond hearing that they would not 
otherwise get under the statute. 9  Requiring a bond hearing in 
such cases might return us to the very situation that Congress 
was trying to fix. 
   
 Because we conclude that Chavez-Alvarez did not act 
in bad faith, we do not need to decide here whether an alien’s 
delay tactics should preclude a bond hearing.  However, the 
                                              
9 We note that we referred to Leslie’s challenges as bona fide, 
leaving the door open to this distinction.  Leslie,  678 F.3d at 




Government’s argument requires us to consider how we are to 
distinguish arguments made in good faith from those that are 
not.  The issue of good faith is necessarily decided on the 
individual circumstances, but the analysis is more complex 
than the method posed by the Government:  counting wins 
and losses.  The most important consideration for us is 
whether an alien challenges aspects of the Government’s case 
that present real issues, for example:  a genuine factual 
dispute; poor legal reasoning; reliance on a contested legal 
theory; or the presence of a new legal issue.  Where questions 
are legitimately raised, the wisdom of our ruling in Leslie is 
plainly relevant:  we cannot “effectively punish” these aliens 
for choosing to exercise their legal right to challenge the 
Government’s case against them by rendering “the 
corresponding increase in time of detention [as] reasonable.”  
Leslie, 678 F.3d at 271.   
  
 The case for Chavez-Alvarez’s removal is grounded in 
his crimes that happened many years before Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement detained him.  Before the Immigration 
Judge, Chavez-Alvarez questioned whether the Government 
correctly alleged that he was convicted of an aggravated 
felony under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(F).  This, in turn, made it 
necessary to study whether the Manual for Courts Marshal 
had the effect of law.  He later argued that he was eligible for 
a 212(h) waiver, and this created a number of unique 
questions centering on the issue of whether Chavez-Alvarez 
has been legally admitted to the country for purposes of the 
waiver.  We cannot find any evidence that Chavez-Alvarez 
raised any of these issues, nor requested any continuance, for 
the purpose of delay.  As everyone agrees, the legal questions 
were complex and unusual, and there is no evidence in the 
record that the Immigration Judge viewed Chavez-Alvarez as 
17 
 
stalling or wasting the court’s time with frivolous arguments.  
In fact, the Immigration Judge said the following before 
issuing the removal order:   
 
Ms. Burch, I want to thank you 
and also Mr. Shagin, as well as 
the Government for the arguments 
that each of you have made.  They 
have been very learned and they 
have referenced some decisions 
that actually haven’t been used in 
a number of years, so I’m grateful 
to you for your willingness to 
argue the points both orally and in 
writing by both parties.   
 
Supp. App. 234.  We are confident that Chavez-Alvarez 
raised a good faith challenge to the Government’s case to 
remove him.10  For this reason, our decision in Leslie controls 
the outcome here.  Chavez-Alvarez undoubtedly is 
responsible for choosing to challenge his removal by raising 
complicated issues that have taken a lot of time to argue and 
decide, but this does not undermine his ability to claim that 
his detention is unreasonable.  
  
 For these reasons, we reject the Government’s general 
position that the conduct of either party here dictates a 
                                              
10 This same confidence extends to the appeals he raised 
before the BIA and this Court.  We make no comment on the 
merits of his appeal, but we do see the issues as worthy of 
appeal. 
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conclusion that the detention is reasonable.  However, as we 
will explain, the reasonableness of the Government’s conduct, 
and the bona fides of Chavez-Alvarez’s challenge did matter 
when we began to weigh the various aspects of this case to 
determine whether, and when, a tipping point had been 
reached on the reasonableness of this detention.11 
 
 We are confident that much, if not all, of Chavez-
Alvarez’s detention during the proceedings before the 
Immigration Judge was ‘“reasonably necessary to secure 
[Chavez-Alvarez’s] removal.’” Diop, 656 F.3d at 234 
(quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699).  The record shows that 
the Immigration Judge scheduled hearings promptly to 
examine issues relating both to Chavez-Alvarez’s removal 
and his waiver; neither the Government nor Chavez-Alvarez 
caused any extraordinary delays during this time; and the 
parties were acting in good faith.  Therefore, after the 
detention went beyond the length considered by the Court in 
Demore—six months—the overall progress of the case still 
provided the Government with a credible argument that the 
resolution of all the issues was reasonably within reach, 
                                              
11 We said earlier that the total number of days that Chavez-
Alvarez has been detained, of itself, gives us reason for pause.  
Even at the time the District Court made its decision, when 
Chavez-Alvarez had been detained for over a year and a half, 
we would have been hard-pressed to conclude that such a 
detention is reasonable.  But, for the sake of providing clear 
guidance to the Attorney General, the Immigration Court and 
the District Court, we want to specify more closely when the 
shift in balance occurred between the benefits of using 
detentions based upon presumptions to achieve the statutory 
goals and the burdens to Chavez-Alvarez’s liberty.   
19 
 
neutralizing any concerns that the detention was no longer 
limited or brief.  The balance of interests at that point still 
favored the Government’s position that the detention was 
reasonably necessary.  However, for many of the same 
reasons we are convinced that, over the six months that 
followed, the balance of interests at stake tipped in favor of 
Chavez-Alvarez’s liberty interests.   
 
 By the time the Immigration Judge issued his final 
order, the length of Chavez-Alvarez’s detention was, as we 
alluded above, straining any common-sense definition of a 
limited or brief civil detention.  Additionally, having held 
Chavez-Alvarez for this amount of time, the Government had, 
by then, enough exposure to Chavez-Alvarez, and sufficient 
time to examine information about him to assess whether he 
truly posed a flight risk or presented any danger to the 
community.  Therefore, reviewing Chavez-Alvarez’s 
detention would not have put the Government in a 
disadvantaged position to make its case.12  Finally, we have 
little doubt that the parties had, by then, a good understanding 
of the credibility and complexity of Chavez-Alvarez’s case.  
Because of this, they could have reasonably predicted that 
Chavez-Alvarez’s appeal would take a substantial amount of 
time, making his already lengthy detention considerably 
longer.  We are aware that the Government filed a motion for 
summary affirmance.  This might have left the Government 
with at least some basis to justify a continued reliance on 
presumptions of flight and danger.  But, certainly at the one-
                                              
12 We read 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c) as giving the Immigration 
Judge jurisdiction to rule on the bond issue even though 




year mark for Chavez-Alvarez’s detention, we are convinced 
that any ground for credibly claiming that a final resolution 
was reasonably within reach would have vanished.   
 
 We have another concern as well.  As the Supreme 
Court said in Zadvydas regarding 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), 
dealing with post-removal order detention: “The proceedings 
at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they 
are nonpunitive in purpose and effect.”  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 
at 690.  Yet, we cannot ignore the conditions of confinement.  
Chavez-Alvarez is being held in detention at the York County 
Prison with those serving terms of imprisonment as a penalty 
for their crimes.  Among our concerns about deprivations to 
liberties brought about by section 1226(c) is the reality that 
merely calling a confinement “civil detention” does not, of 
itself, meaningfully differentiate it from penal measures.  
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); see also 
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).  As the length of 
the detention grows, the weight given to this aspect of his 
detention increases. 
 
 For all of these reasons, we are convinced that, 
beginning sometime after the six-month timeframe 
considered by Demore, and certainly by the time Chavez-
Alvarez had been detained for one year, the burdens to 
Chavez-Alvarez’s liberties outweighed any justification for 
using presumptions to detain him without bond to further the 
goals of the statute.  We conclude that the underlying goals of 
the statute would not have been, and will not now be 
undermined by requiring the Government to produce 
individualized evidence that Chavez-Alvarez’s continued 
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detention was or is necessary.13  We will reverse the District 
Court’s order, and remand with instruction to enter an order 
granting the writ of habeas corpus and ensure that Chavez-
Alvarez is afforded, within ten days of the entry of this order, 
a hearing to determine whether, on evidence particular to 
Chavez-Alvarez, it is necessary to continue to detain him to 
achieve the goals of the statute.   
                                              
13 To the extent that it relevant, any additional burden given 
to the Government here in this individual case is outweighed 
by the general interest in our society of protecting against an 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.          
 
